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BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING: 
HOW CORPORATIONS USE TRANSFER 
PRICING TO AVOID TAXATION 
GREGORY PUN* 
Abstract: In an increasingly global economy, base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS) has allowed multinational corporations to utilize their subsidiaries to 
move assets and profits. As a result, corporations are able to lower their tax bills, 
but also deprive governments of integral tax funds, while leaving smaller com-
petitors who pay their fair share of taxes at a disadvantage. To combat the effects 
of BEPS, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has collaborated with the Group of 20 (G20) major economies for the first time 
to implement an action plan. The BEPS Project seeks to ensure all corporations 
pay proper taxes to the government of each country in which they operate by ad-
dressing issues presented by transfer pricing and profit reporting. As the plan has 
been developed by the world’s major economies, difficulties arise for developing 
countries that may not have the resources to implement the plan successfully. At-
tempts to implement a universal rule face further difficulties given that an array 
of treaties addressing these issues already exist. To ease the transition, the BEPS 
Project utilizes safe harbors—sacrificing equity for efficiency in many instances. 
While the collaborative effort represents a major step forward, and the creation of 
the plan and first efforts to implement it are certainly beneficial, there is still a lot 
of work to be done. Questions remain regarding how to properly address BEPS 
and create a universally fair system for economies and corporations of all sizes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), in collaboration with the Group of 20 (G20) major economies, put 
forward a plan of action to combat base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).1 In 
                                                                                                                           
 * Gregory Pun is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review. 
 1 About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M9KH-4C64]. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) was founded in 1960 by the United States, Canada, and eighteen European countries to facili-
tate economic development. Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersand
partners/ [https://perma.cc/CRP3-RGDD]. The OECD currently consists of thirty-five member coun-
tries, including many of the world’s largest economies, and a number of emerging countries. Id. The 
OECD works closely with emerging economies and developing countries in order to foster and en-
courage economic development. Id. The Group of 20 (G20) nations is composed of nineteen of the 
world’s largest economies—including China, Russia, and India—and the European Union, whose 
finance ministers and central bank governors meet biannually. Kimberly Amadeo, What Does the G20 
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2016, the OECD and a number of participants took action by establishing the 
first legislative and administrative efforts of the BEPS Project.2 In layman’s 
terms, BEPS refers to the negative effects of multinational companies’ efforts 
to avoid taxation by moving profits to low or no-tax locations.3 The goal of the 
OECD and G20 nations—working on equal footing for the first time—is to 
reinforce the integrity of the global tax system.4 
Multinational companies operate certain portions of their business in dif-
ferent countries, and strategically handle their business between countries in 
order to reduce their tax bill.5 Corporations exploit mismatches between na-
tions where they conduct businesses in order to generate benefits from double 
non-taxation.6 Corporations also utilize the digital economy to sell goods in 
places where they have no physical presence, which often means profits from 
such sales are not taxed in that country.7 The OECD has begun to address these 
issues through the BEPS Project to ensure corporations are paying their fair 
share of taxes.8 While BEPS issues go beyond those created by transfer pric-
ing, transfer pricing has been a central component of the discussion on how to 
address BEPS.9 
Corporations often exploit transfer pricing laws in order to create tax ben-
efits.10 Multinational corporations accomplish this by reporting profits to enti-
ties in tax havens that do not correspond with the actual activities by those en-
tities.11 This allows those multinational corporations to evade the higher tax 
bill they would have received if they had reported profits in the higher tax ju-
risdictions where they actually occurred.12 Corporations that are vertically in-
tegrated are much less likely to participate in arm’s length transactions; rather, 
                                                                                                                           
Do?, BALANCE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-g20-3306114 [https://
perma.cc/6AJ2-FWDZ]. The group was formed in 1999 with the purpose of discussing and addressing 
the key issues affecting the global economy. Id. 
 2 See ERNST & YOUNG, THE LATEST ON BEPS—2016 MID-YEAR REVIEW 14–15 (2016), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-the-latest-on-beps-2016-mid-year-review/$FILE/
EY-the-latest-on-beps-2016-mid-year-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC6H-VTZE] (describing the 
opening of the Multilateral Component Authority Agreement and listing those jurisdictions that have 
signed on). 
 3 See About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, supra note 1. 
 4 Patrick Love, BEPS: Why You’re Taxed More Than a Multinational, OECD INSIGHTS (Feb. 13, 
2013), http://oecdinsights.org/2013/02/13/beps-why-youre-taxed-more-than-a-multinational/ [https://
perma.cc/Y3SK-YKWN]. 
 5 See BEPS Explained, ATEL, Oct.–Dec. 2014, at 9, 9, http://www.nxtbook.com/newpress/
atel/le-magazine-du-tresorier/87-4T2014/#/8 [https://perma.cc/W7DB-B2AB]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, supra note 1. 
 9 See BEPS Explained, supra note 5, at 11. 
 10 See id. 
 11 What is Transfer Pricing?, WTP ADVISORS, http://wtpadvisors.com/tax-advisory/what-is-
transfer-pricing [https://perma.cc/FYK2-W2Z9]. 
 12 See id. 
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they are more inclined to attempt to transfer goods between entities for below 
market value because they are controlling both sides of the transaction.13 These 
corporations often report profits in tax havens that are significantly greater 
than what would be expected based on the work actually done there.14 This 
allows corporations to avoid taxation in developed countries and instead pay 
the lighter tax bill wherever they choose to report their profits.15 The OECD 
has directly addressed the issues created by transfer pricing in order to ensure 
proper taxation.16 Actions 8, 9, and 10 of the BEPS Project are aimed at align-
ing transfer pricing outcomes with their respective value creation.17 To do this, 
the use of intangibles, risks, capital, and other high-risk transactions intended 
to shift profits must be examined more closely.18 
BEPS is hurting the global economy in a number of ways, including de-
priving nations of valuable income needed to jumpstart growth.19 Further, the 
use of BEPS strategies creates a sense of distrust among citizens who may in 
turn question the overall fairness of the tax system.20 Additionally, some re-
searchers believe that the economic effects spread and cause a decline in em-
ployment, innovation, and productivity when post-tax profit becomes the main 
attractor for investment.21 
This Note examines the issues created by base erosion and profit shifting. 
While a number of strategies exist to accomplish the goals of BEPS, this Note 
focuses on the exploitation of transfer pricing. Part I of this Note explains the 
strategies that multinational corporations use to avoid taxation through BEPS 
and the efforts the U.S. government is taking to prevent reliance on these strat-
egies. Part II explains the legal issues presented by BEPS and the difficulty of 
enforcing the current rules. In Part III, this Note suggests that while the efforts 
put forth by the OECD and G20 nations will have a material impact by forcing 
multinational corporations to pay closer to their fair share of taxes, the pro-
posed changes will face widespread challenges and will be unable to close all 
of the existing loopholes. 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Lee Sheppard, Transfer Pricing as Tax Avoidance, FORBES (June 25, 2010, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/24/tax-finance-multinational-economics-opinions-columnists-lee-
sheppard.html [https://perma.cc/P8LT-WXBT]. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 20 (2013), https://
www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM2X-P78Q] [hereinafter OECD, ACTION 
PLAN]. 
 17 See id. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See OECD Presents Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS Project for Discussion at G20 Finance Min-
isters Meeting, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-presents-outputs-of-oecd-g20-beps-project-for-
discussion-at-g20-finance-ministers-meeting.htm [https://perma.cc/LDF5-YKAZ]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Love, supra note 4. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The BEPS Plan 
In 2013, the OECD began to collaborate with the G20 nations in order to 
address issues created by base erosion and profit shifting by multinational cor-
porations.22 The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organization con-
sisting of thirty-five member countries working toward economic progress.23 
The G20 is the leading organization for international collaboration on econom-
ic issues.24 The G20 consists of nineteen countries and the European Union 
with member economies responsible for eighty-six percent of global economic 
activity, seventy-eight percent of international trade, and two-thirds of the 
global population.25 In 2016, the OECD and a limited number of participating 
countries began to finally put the first steps of the BEPS Project into action.26 
B. What Is BEPS and How Is It Possible? 
It is widely accepted that companies are able to strategically position their 
operations in order to lower their corporate tax bill.27 It is estimated that any-
where between four and ten percent of corporate tax revenues are lost through 
these methods.28 These estimates conservatively suggest that between one 
hundred and two hundred and forty billion dollars of corporate income tax rev-
enues are being lost annually due to BEPS.29 This is a particularly large prob-
lem for developing countries that rely heavily on corporate income tax for 
government funding.30 To combat these massive losses, the G20 countries have 
coordinated with the OECD to create rules and regulations to ensure that com-
panies are paying the right amount of taxes.31 
One major strategy that corporations utilize to avoid taxation is transfer 
pricing.32 To take advantage of transfer pricing, corporations allocate profits 
among their subsidiaries in different jurisdictions, acting as though the corpo-
                                                                                                                           
 22 About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, supra note 1. 
 23 Who Does What, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/whodoeswhat/ [https://perma.cc/LB5V-
K5EU]. 
 24 The G20, AUSTL. GOV’T: DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/international-
relations/international-organisations/g20/pages/the-g20.aspx [https://perma.cc/KZ86-VHQJ]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 27 See About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, supra note 1. 
 28 See id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id. (explaining that the OECD and G20 countries have collaborated to create a fifteen-point 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) action plan). 
 32 See Patrick Love, What Is BEPS and How Can You Stop It?, OECD INSIGHTS (July 19, 2013), 
http://oecdinsights.org/2013/07/19/what-is-beps-how-can-you-stop-it/ [https://perma.cc/GMR3-Z2N2] 
(explaining the issues presented by BEPS and the role of transfer pricing). 
2017] How Corporations Use Transfer Pricing to Avoid Taxation 291 
rate affiliates are all separate economic actors engaging in arm’s length trans-
actions with one another.33 While the principals of financial accounting treat 
the corporate group as one single entity, the laws of federal income taxation do 
not.34 These laws treat a corporation and all of its subsidiaries as separate eco-
nomic actors, which essentially allows multinational corporations to determine 
where they would like their profits to be taxed, or where they would like to 
allocate the profits to avoid taxation.35 
Corporations utilize transfer pricing to report their profits in nations that 
are considered tax havens in order to avoid taxation in developed countries.36 
Manipulation often leads to profit reporting that does not align with actual val-
ue creation.37 While this seems problematic from a taxation perspective, some 
academics argue that the use of transfer pricing and profit shifting is essential 
in supporting decentralization and coordination.38 Transfer pricing encourages 
all of the entities of a multinational corporation to work together while spread-
ing profits to lower tax jurisdictions.39 Additionally, corporations claim being 
able to strategically avoid taxation is integral to remaining competitive in the 
market.40 Corporations would not be able to keep up with competitors if they 
were forced to pay a larger tax bill while those competitors were able to avoid 
a number of taxes.41 Despite these perceived advantages, the issues surround-
ing transfer pricing outweigh the benefits, as many corporations strategically 
work to avoid taxation in high tax jurisdictions and governments are denied 
essential funding.42 
C. Can This Be Fixed? 
While the issues created through transfer pricing have been observed for a 
number of years, efforts to curb the practice have been met with limited suc-
cess.43 Over the last decade, the U.S. government has brought multinational 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Sheppard, supra note 13. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION 9 (2015), http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315351e.pdf?expires=1487538349&id=id&accname=
guest&checksum=37D727ACB621B3DC5809B2E6BBD97C56 [https://perma.cc/J8DA-7FYC] 
[hereinafter OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION]. 
 38 KENNETH KLASSEN, PETRO LISOWSKY & DEVAN MESCALL, TRANSFER PRICING: STRATEGIES, 
PRACTICES, AND TAX MINIMIZATION 91–92, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13rescontransferpricing.
pdf [https://perma.cc/94TE-HRX3]. 
 39 See id. 
 40 Sheppard, supra note 13. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See Roger J. Jones et al., Altera: Tax Court Invalidates Section 482 Regulation on Administra-
tive Law Grounds, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.mwe.com/Altera-Tax-
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corporations to court multiple times, only to see its efforts fail.44 In 2010, the 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced its decision to create a new 
Director of Transfer Pricing position due to concerns about revenue loss 
through transfer pricing.45 Ernst & Young has surveyed tax authorities since 
1995 regarding the number of staff members they have dedicated to specific 
issues.46 Following their 2012 survey, the accounting giant concluded that tax 
authorities have continuously hired additional staff members devoted specifi-
cally to the issue of transfer pricing.47 
In 2013, the OECD displayed greater concerns about the impacts of trans-
fer pricing and began to conduct research regarding the best plan to limit or 
eliminate BEPS.48 The OECD has come up with actions to try to align the 
transfer pricing outcomes with value creation.49 Three actions of the OECD’s 
fifteen-part plan are dedicated to ensuring transfer pricing outcomes align with 
their value creation.50 Actions 8, 9, and 10 call for the OECD to create a set of 
rules that prevent BEPS through the movement of intangibles between related 
parties, the transferring of risk and disproportional allocation of capital be-
tween related parties, and the engagement of transactions that would be unlike-
ly to occur between third parties.51 
These actions aim to ensure that actual business transactions completed 
by associated enterprises are present, and transfer pricing is based on economic 
reality rather than simple contractual arrangements within a multinational cor-
poration.52 This will guarantee that the allocation of risks among multiple enti-
ties within the same corporation is supported by actual decision-making.53 
The plan seeks to reduce the impact of capital-rich, low-functioning enti-
ties in BEPS planning.54 It will ensure that premium returns are only allocated 
                                                                                                                           
Court-Invalidates-Section-482-Regulation-on-Administrative-Law-Grounds-08-19-2015/ [https://
perma.cc/S7H3-6VXY] (explaining that Altera Corp v. Commissioner is one of many examples of the 
tax court invalidating regulations under I.R.C. Section 482). 
 44 See Sheppard, supra note 13. 
 45 KLASSEN, supra note 38. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See About BEPS and the Inclusive Framework, supra note 1. 
 49 See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 37, 
at 9–12. 
 50 See id. 
 51 OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 16, at 19–21. Action 8 states that the OECD must “[d]evelop 
rules to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among group members.” Id. at 20. Action 9 states that they 
must “[d]evelop rules to prevent BEPS by transferring risks among, or allocating excessive capital to, 
group members.” Id. Action 10 states that the OECD must “[d]evelop rules to prevent BEPS by engaging 
in transactions which would not, or would only very rarely, occur between third parties.” Id. 
 52 See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 37, 
at 13. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. at 11. 
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to the relevant substance, so risk-free return is only generated by capital with 
actual functionality.55 This will prevent multinational corporations from report-
ing substantial profits to entities that have provided relatively small contribu-
tions.56 The plan further regulates the transfer of intangibles.57 For the purpos-
es of these actions, intangibles are non-physical, non-financial assets that may 
be used for commercial purposes, and would normally be purchased when 
transferred between unrelated parties.58 The returns received from intangibles 
will accrue to the entities that carry out the actual process of value creation 
rather than naturally accruing to the legal owner of the intangibles.59 
The ultimate goal for the OECD and G20 nations is to ensure the ar-
rangements are determined and the pricing takes into account the actual contri-
butions of the involved parties.60 This will require companies to keep track of 
the accurate delineation of intercompany transactions, transactions involving 
intangibles, and cost contribution arrangements.61 In Actions 8 through 10 of 
the OECD’s BEPS Project, the OECD attempts to confirm transfer pricing out-
comes are in line with value creation.62 However, some academics believe this 
vague terminology diminishes the value of the BEPS Project.63 In order to en-
sure that transfer prices are fair, the OECD seeks to apply the arm’s length 
principle to the transactions occurring within a multinational corporation.64 In 
effect, the OECD aims to equate the transactions within a multinational corpo-
ration to the behavior of unrelated parties under similar circumstances.65 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id. at 13. 
 56 See id. 
 57 BEPS Action Plan: Action 8—Transfer Pricing and Intangibles, PWC, http://www.
pwc.com/gx/en/services/tax/tax-policy-administration/beps/transfer-pricing-and-intangibles.html 
[https://perma.cc/JA2M-L8RE] (explaining how accrual from intangibles will be determined for pur-
poses of Action 8 of the BEPS plan). 
 58 OECD Issues Final Guidance on Transfer Pricing for Intangibles Under BEPS Action 8, EY (Oct. 
13, 2015), http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--oecd-issues-final-guidance-on-
transfer-pricing-for-intangibles-under-beps-action-8 [https://perma.cc/SXR9-LQCA]. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 37, 
at 9–12 (detailing the overall plan for Actions 8 through 10). 
 63 See Herman B. Bouma, The OECD’s BEPS Project: The Emperor Has No Clothes, BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.bna.com/oecds-beps-project-n57982065958/ [https://perma.cc/G2ZJ-
RYTL] (arguing that the lack of strong definitions throughout the BEPS Project will lead to limited 
results). 
 64 See PWC, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION—REVISED 
CHAPTERS I, II, VI, AND VII OF THE OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES 2 (2015), http://www.
pwc.com/gx/en/services/tax/newsletters/tax-controversy-dispute-resolution/aligning-transfer-pricing-
outcomes-with-value-creation.html [https://perma.cc/3D5S-35UJ]. 
 65 See id. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A number of multinational corporations utilize BEPS strategies by mov-
ing profits across borders where they will be taxed at a more favorable rate.66 
This strategy deprives national governments of the proper tax bill owed and 
makes it more difficult for smaller businesses to compete.67 The BEPS action 
plan aims to reestablish the integrity of the corporate income tax system, while 
promoting fairness and competition.68 
Creating a proposal that is appealing to all nations is extremely difficult, 
particularly because the issue involves competition between these countries to 
offer tax breaks in order to attract businesses.69 Systems that exempt certain 
foreign income, even if it has not been taxed abroad, prevent countries from 
taxing the income of the multinational enterprises earned globally.70 
A. OECD’s Primary Transfer Pricing Actions 
The OECD is currently trying to resolve a number of issues to close the 
door on BEPS.71 One of the primary efforts of the OECD entails clarifying and 
establishing stronger transfer pricing rules regarding the sale of intangibles.72 
Actions 8 through 10 deal with the issues created by intangibles, capital, and 
high-risk transactions.73 These actions seek to align transfer pricing outcomes 
with their coinciding value creation, rather than allowing multinational corpo-
rations to report profits where value creation did not truly occur.74 
The spread of the digital economy has made it more difficult to keep track 
of value creation and ensure proper taxation.75 With digital services, intellectu-
al property, and other intangibles being used to generate revenue, tax admin-
istrations are faced with the challenge of determining where that income is re-
ally being generated.76 The digital economy raises questions about how value 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Love, supra note 32. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See BEPS Explained, supra note 5. 
 69 BEPS MONITORING GROUP, OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE G20/OECD BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS) PROJECT 3, http://www.ictd.ac/images/files/General_Evaluation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/27J8-GZW9] (discussing the impact that competitiveness among countries has on 
creating effective international plans). 
 70 Id. at 4. 
 71 See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 5 (2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2313151e.pdf?expires=1490117622&id=id&accname=ocid195113&
checksum=872163C3A24B93C08C6D12BC08CF78B9 [https://perma.cc/B4VG-CHBR] [hereinafter 
OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING] (describing the entire BEPS plan). 
 72 See id. at 84. 
 73 See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 16, at 49. 
 74 See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 37, 
at 9–12. 
 75 See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 16, at 10. 
 76 See id. at 7–11. 
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is added and profits are made, and how the concepts of source and residence of 
income should be applied for tax purposes.77 In order to determine how current 
rules should be adapted to best prevent BEPS, multinational enterprises’ use of 
the digital economy must be closely examined to understand how exactly they 
add value and profit.78 Actions 8 through 10 of the OECD’s BEPS plan are 
aimed at ensuring that transfer price outcomes coincide with their actual value 
creation.79 
Action 8 specifically aims to eliminate BEPS by moving intangibles.80 To 
do this, the OECD plans to create a clear definition of intangibles, which will 
then allow them to ensure that the profits associated with those intangibles are 
appropriately allocated.81 Further, specific transfer pricing rules will be devel-
oped for hard-to-value intangibles.82 Hard-to-value intangibles are intangibles 
with a highly uncertain value at the time of transfer.83 Hard-to-value intangi-
bles are often created in early in the process of development for new commodi-
ties and may require significant additional research and funding before the true 
value may be determined.84 This approach will check whether the taxpayer 
appropriately accounted for reasonably foreseeable developments, and if the 
proper forecasts were used in the determination of the transfer price of a hard-
to-value intangible.85 
Action 9 aims to prevent BEPS through the transfer of risks or allocation 
of excessive capital to subsidiaries of a multinational corporation.86 This 
measure will require that multinational corporations report returns that are 
aligned with the proper value creation.87 This will ensure that multinational 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 10. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. at 20. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 OECD Issues Final Guidance on Transfer Pricing for Intangibles Under BEPS Action 8, supra 
note 58.  
 83 Id. (“HTVIs are defined as ‘intangibles or rights in intangibles for which, at the time of their 
transfer between associated enterprises, (i) no reliable comparables exist; and (ii) at the time the trans-
action[s] was entered into, the projections of future cash flows or income expected to be derived from 
the transferred intangible, or the assumptions used in valuing the intangible are highly uncertain, mak-
ing it difficult to predict the level of ultimate success of the intangible at the time of transfer.’”) (alter-
ation in original). 
 84 GRANT THORNTON, BEPS ACTION 8: HARD-TO-VALUE INTANGIBLES (HTVIS) 3 (2015), 
https://www.grantthornton.ie/globalassets/1.-member-firms/global/services/tax-pdfs/13.-beps-action-
8---hard-to-value-intangibles-htvis-june-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SL8-354R]. 
 85 OECD Releases Final Reports on BEPS Action Plan, EY (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.ey.com/
GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Alert--OECD-releases-final-reports-on-BEPS-Action-Plan 
[https://perma.cc/W4XK-EL8B]. 
 86 OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 16, at 20. 
 87 Id.  
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corporations only allocate risks and capital to entities that are proportional to 
their actual contributions.88 
Action 10 aims to prevent multinational corporations from engaging in 
high-risk transactions that other third parties would be unlikely to engage in.89 
The action seeks to apply the arm’s length transaction principal to transfers 
between different entities within a multinational corporation.90 To do this, the 
circumstances surrounding transactions must be examined so that reports of 
profits are aligned with value creation.91 Further, the application of transfer 
pricing methods within the context of global value chains of multinational cor-
porations must be clarified.92 Action 10 requires strong correlations between 
profit allocation factors and the actual creation of value, to ensure that transac-
tions within a multinational corporation are consistent with the arm’s length 
principle.93 
B. Other OECD Transfer Pricing Actions 
In addition to the direct aim of Actions 8, 9, and 10 of the OECD’s BEPS 
plan, other actions play more indirect roles in combatting transfer pricing.94 In 
particular, Action 1 addresses the need to adjust taxation so that it can be readi-
ly applied to the digital economy.95 
Action 7 aims to prevent multinational corporations from improperly re-
porting their permanent establishment status.96 Tax administrations must de-
termine whether actions that were previously considered preparatory should 
now be considered significant in the digital economy.97 Additionally, the term 
“permanent establishment” may need to be adjusted to take into consideration 
transactions that can be seen as artificial transfers within a multinational corpo-
ration.98 The OECD proposed several changes to the definition of permanent 
establishment in a 2015 report on Action 7.99 The acceptance of these changes 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. at 19–20. 
 91 See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 37, 
at 9–12. 
 92 See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 16, at 19–20. 
 93 DELOITTE, BEPS ACTION 10: USE OF PROFIT SPLITS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS 2 (2015), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/Tax/BEPS%20
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means a corporation will no longer be required to conclude contracts in a given 
country in order for that country to be considered its permanent establish-
ment.100 
Further, soliciting orders or obtaining offers to enter into standard-form 
contracts from a country may be enough for that country to be considered a 
permanent establishment, even if no negotiation takes place there.101 Finally, 
certain exemptions from permanent establishment status may be eliminated for 
certain foreign entities, depending on how central the relevant activities of the 
foreign entity are to its business.102 
While most actions of the BEPS plan aim to actively address the issues, 
Action 11 seeks to more effectively measure the impacts of BEPS.103 This ac-
tion will allow tax administrations to “monitor and evaluate the effectiveness” 
of the strategies they utilize to prevent BEPS.104 In order to accomplish this, an 
economic analysis must be created to measure the impact of BEPS through 
existing data, which will allow tax administrations to determine the appropriate 
actions to address it, as well as allow them to identify what other relevant data 
should be collected.105 
Action 13 addresses the need for better transfer pricing documentation.106 
The OECD and participating governments are working to establish documenta-
tion requirements in an effort to enforce compliance while also acquiring in-
formation that will allow them to better understand transfer pricing.107 Coun-
try-by-country reporting was a specific mandate by the G20 leaders in the ef-
fort to limit BEPS.108 Requiring country-by-country reporting is essential for 
tracking where economic activities occur and ensuring that the multinational 
corporations are taxed where the value is created.109 
However, country-by-country reporting is only required for those multi-
national enterprises with over seven hundred and fifty million euros of revenue 
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in the preceding fiscal year, or a domestic currency equivalent.110 This high 
threshold is projected to except eighty-five to ninety percent of multinational 
corporations from mandatory reporting.111 Despite these exclusions, the multi-
national corporations that will be required to file account for ninety percent of 
international corporate revenue.112 For these reasons, the threshold strikes a 
balance between the difficulty of ensuring complete reporting and the benefits 
of tax collection to the governments.113 
The OECD has also established safe harbor provisions in order to resolve 
less-contentious transfer pricing issues quickly, which allows for greater focus 
on larger scale matters regarding BEPS.114 Safe harbors decrease administra-
tive costs, create clearer rules for taxpayers and tax administrations alike, and 
reduce the possibility of litigation in many cases.115 Safe harbor provisions aim 
to accomplish these goals by substituting simplified obligations for the general 
transfer pricing rules in the jurisdiction.116 
For example, a safe harbor provision may exclude certain taxpayers and 
transactions from transfer pricing regulations that would otherwise apply.117 In 
particular, these provisions target smaller taxpayers and less intricate dealings.118 
This eases the burden on eligible taxpayers, as it provides them with a level of 
certainty that their transfer prices will be accepted as long as they are in compli-
ance.119 Further, safe harbors allow developing countries in particular to opti-
mize their limited resources in their effort to limit transfer pricing issues.120 
C. Transfer Pricing Regulation Difficulties 
The IRS has attempted to establish regulations to limit the ability of mul-
tinational corporations to successfully use transfer pricing to shift profits and 
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avoid taxation.121 I.R.C. Section 482 is specifically intended to prevent transfer 
pricing and limit the abilities of multinational corporations to participate in 
base erosion and profit shifting schemes.122 The primary purpose of Section 
482 is to ensure corporations allocate income to the proper transactions to pre-
vent the avoidance of taxation on these transactions.123  
Because regulations interpreting this provision have been challenged and 
overruled, the legislation has had limited regulatory success.124 In the 2015 
case Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, the United States Tax Court invalidated 
regulations under Section 482, which forced participants of certain cost-
sharing agreements to split costs of stock-based compensation.125 
In 2003, the IRS created a rule that required cost-sharing arrangements to 
include the costs of stock-based compensation plans.126 The IRS originally 
ruled that requiring stock-based compensation to be considered in cost-sharing 
arrangements was consistent with the arm’s length standard.127 However, the 
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irb/2003-42_IRB/ar07.html [https://perma.cc/8M4R-88ZM]. 
 127 Id. While I.R.C. Section 482 does not explicitly state the arm’s length principle should be 
applied, it is generally accepted that the arm’s length principle should be read into the rule.  INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., LB&I INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE SERVICE TRANSACTION UNIT 3 (2013), https://
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ruling of the IRS was overturned in Altera, where the court found the arm’s 
length standard did not apply.128 The case involved the IRS issuing notices of 
deficiency to Altera for their failure to properly allocate income in accordance 
with cost-sharing regulations.129 The IRS stated that in order to comply with 
the regulations under Section 482 and achieve an arm’s length result, taxpayers 
must share stock-based compensation costs in qualified cost-sharing agree-
ments.130 However, this rule was challenged and overturned by the court, 
which held that the IRS must show relevant evidence to justify such a rule.131 
The court found that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious, and that there 
was no sufficient purpose for the regulation.132 Altera was the first time the 
Tax Court used the arbitrary and capricious standard when considering IRS 
regulations.133 
The decision in Altera suggests that the IRS may not regulate transfer 
pricing transactions under the arm’s length standard unless it can prove that 
those regulations accurately reflect how unrelated parties would act in a similar 
transaction.134 This decision undid some of the efforts of the IRS to regulate 
transfer pricing, and gives taxpayers a precedent on which to base future ar-
guments against IRS regulations that fail to effectively apply the arm’s length 
transaction principal.135 
The application of the arbitrary and capricious standard opens the door 
for other taxpayers to challenge IRS regulations more frequently.136 In the past, 
the IRS has not been careful to provide the necessary evidence required under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard and may be at risk of facing more chal-
lenges to its regulations.137 The IRS now must provide empirical data to justify 
regulations that are based on factual determinations.138 Ultimately, the IRS 
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cannot create regulations based on how they believe multinational corporations 
should act if there is no fact-based evidence to show they actually behave in 
that manner.139 
D. First Efforts to Implement Changes 
In 2016, the OECD and some participating jurisdictions began to move 
past the preliminary planning phase of the BEPS Project and changes were 
implemented.140 To assist with effective implementation, the OECD has devel-
oped a multilateral instrument that will allow existing bilateral treaties to 
quickly implement the tax treaty measures developed throughout the BEPS 
Project.141 Ideally, to allow the plan to go as smoothly as possible, the multilat-
eral instrument will be signed by most of the participating jurisdictions.142 The 
multilateral instrument will become effective once five countries have agreed 
to implement it and it will only apply to tax treaties where all parties have 
agreed to utilize the multilateral instrument and those parties have been given 
enough time to fully understand the effects.143 
In addition to the development of the multilateral instrument, a number of 
countries have developed and implemented legal and administrative frame-
works to prepare for country-by-country reporting.144 Country-by-country re-
porting requires multinational corporations that generate more than a certain 
amount of revenue to file a report regarding how income has been allocated 
among various jurisdictions, taxes paid in those jurisdictions, and where eco-
nomic activities have occurred among those various tax jurisdictions.145 The 
exchange of country-by-country reports will begin by mid-2018.146 While 
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these efforts are a step in the right direction, there is still a lot of work to be 
done surrounding BEPS.147 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Impact of BEPS 
BEPS is a multinational issue that must be handled through the coopera-
tion of all nations affected.148 Research has estimated that between four and ten 
percent of global corporate income tax revenue is lost annually due to 
BEPS.149 The issue has brought the OECD and the G20 countries together to 
work on a level playing field.150 Further, over a dozen developing countries are 
working toward a solution, while more than eighty non-OECD, non-G20 juris-
dictions offered opinions on the subject.151 The cooperation of the G20 and the 
OECD demonstrates commitment to a common goal.152 The BEPS Project 
aims to tax profits where they are generated, while providing corporations with 
more certainty regarding the international tax rules.153 Because BEPS is a 
global problem, the creation of the BEPS plan has taken into account the opin-
ions and ideas of various parties, from the OECD and G20 countries to dozens 
of developing countries and over eighty non-OECD, non-G20 jurisdictions.154 
B. Effects of Actions 8, 9, and 10 
The OECD and the G20 nations have begun to solve the issue of BEPS 
primarily by addressing the cost of intangibles, risks, capital, and high-risk 
transactions and ensuring they are reported in the proper jurisdiction.155 Action 
8 of the BEPS Project aims to simplify identification of intangibles, which will 
inherently make it easier to regulate their transfer.156 To do this, the OECD 
broadly defines intangibles as something that is not a physical asset or a finan-
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cial asset.157 From this definition, intangibles are split into marketing intangi-
bles and trade intangibles.158 Being able to clearly establish what constitutes 
intangibles naturally makes it easier to regulate them.159 
Even if the OECD is able to clearly define intangibles, there will still be 
instances in which those intangibles are hard to value.160 To effectively under-
stand the transfer of intangibles, the contractual terms and actual legal owner-
ship of the intangible must be considered in light of the relationship of the 
transacting parties.161 In instances where the intangibles are hard to value, en-
terprises may consider the anticipated benefits as a means for pricing the trans-
action.162 Multinational corporations may also consider the risks posed due to 
the high level of uncertainty in valuing intangibles.163 While the OECD may be 
able to clearly define intangibles and find mildly comparable circumstances, 
questions still remain on how the value of those intangibles should be deter-
mined.164 
Action 9 will help prevent capital-rich entities from allocating excessive 
profits if they fail to perform economic tasks related to the transaction and do 
not have control over the financial risk.165 This will help guarantee that income 
is allocated to the proper entities.166Action 10 will ensure that the affiliates of 
multinational corporations only engage in transactions that make financial 
sense and would be likely to occur between independent third parties.167 This 
action provides a solid framework for treating issues concerning the various 
profit allocation methods.168 The commodity transactions method may be more 
appropriate for instances where the transactions are centered on commodi-
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ties.169 The value of low value-adding services must also be examined to de-
termine if the profit allocation for those services is appropriate.170 
The transactional profit split method requires that the transaction be ex-
amined to determine what constitutes unique and valuable contributions.171 If 
multiple entities make unique and valuable contributions, then a profit split 
between those entities is appropriate.172 The full effects of the BEPS plan will 
become more evident over time as the plan is fully implemented and the results 
may be observed.173 For now, questions remain regarding application of the 
plan, creating uncertain expectations for corporations.174 For instance, some 
standards implemented by the OECD differ from existing U.S. tax law and 
create questions for taxpayers.175 Until it is clear how the contradicting chang-
es will be implemented, corporations must view the results of their transactions 
from numerous viewpoints and contemplate various potential results.176 
C. Issues with Country-by-Country Reporting 
One major step to ensure compliance and reduce the success of BEPS 
strategies is to require transparency.177 The OECD believes data collection on 
BEPS must be improved and more accessible.178 Further, taxpayers should be 
required to provide more information on their tax planning strategies, and 
transfer pricing documentation requirements must be made simpler and focus 
more on relevant information.179  
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While country-by-country reporting will be important in addressing BEPS 
issues going forward, this reporting system is not without its flaws.180 While 
the seven hundred and fifty million euro threshold for reporting will require 
corporations controlling ninety percent of the files to report, most corporations 
will not be required to report.181 The threshold makes sense in the economies 
of the large G20 countries, but will not provide the same type of benefit in de-
veloping countries.182 
Furthermore, the country-by-country reporting records must be made pub-
lic to be most effective.183 Critics believe corporations should be required to dis-
close this information to investors, stakeholders, and the general public.184 Re-
quiring these records to be public is necessary to restore public confidence in the 
international tax system.185 Publication would allow for more comprehensive 
research, as it would provide critical information to national governments, inter-
national organizations, and scholars.186 The existing data is insufficient, which 
makes it difficult for researchers to understand how to fully address BEPS and 
its related problems.187 If these country-by-country reports are made available, 
researchers will have access to invaluable information.188 Alternatively, in lieu of 
publication, a policy of granting limited access under special circumstances for 
research purposes could achieve some of these same goals.189 
D. Issues in Developing Countries 
While the United States and other G20 countries struggle to create regula-
tions to effectively curb BEPS strategies, developing countries face an even 
greater challenge.190 Developing countries may rely even more heavily on their 
tax revenue, but they often have rules that fail to effectively regulate BEPS 
issues and they lack the resources necessary to create and implement the prop-
er rules.191 One global accounting firm estimates that if transfer pricing issues 
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are properly dealt with, developing countries may collect over forty percent 
more in tax revenue from multinational corporations.192 
Further, developing countries lack the resources to gather the relevant da-
ta needed to create the proper rules.193 In some cases, the proposed solutions 
for BEPS are too complex and resource intensive for developing countries, 
considering the resources they have available.194 Smaller economies lose out 
on valuable revenue needed to further development.195 
Additionally, country-by-country reporting is only required by those mul-
tinational enterprises with annual consolidated group revenue of seven hundred 
and fifty million euros or more in the preceding fiscal year.196 This high 
threshold for country-by-country reporting will likely limit the ability of de-
veloping countries to gather and access the data that is available to the larger 
G20 economies.197 The high threshold may leave developing nations without 
information on multinational enterprises that are essential to them.198 While the 
threshold creates a balance between the reporting burden and tax benefits for 
G20 governments, the benefits are experienced largely by the bigger econo-
mies.199 
While governments in developed countries use taxes to finance aid, 
among other things, developing countries rely on this income to continue their 
economic and infrastructural progression.200 If developing countries are able to 
receive the proper taxes from multinational corporations, they will be able to 
continue to grow and create a bigger tax base, which will allow them to be-
come less dependent on foreign aid.201 Thus, addressing the issue of transfer 
pricing in developing countries would be beneficial to both developed and de-
veloping countries.202 
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E. The Value of Additional Revenue and the Arm’s Length Principal 
As discussed previously, the revenue losses from BEPS have been esti-
mated at between one hundred and two hundred and forty billion dollars.203 
While these numbers may seem high at first glance, some believe their signifi-
cance is overstated when considered within their context.204 Global tax reve-
nues amount to over twenty-three trillion dollars.205 Taxation efforts will inevi-
tably be unable to recapture all lost revenue.206 If taxation efforts are able to 
raise another one hundred billion dollars, governments would only be adding 
0.4 percent to their current tax revenue.207 Compared to the global tax revenues 
and the global economy as a whole, these lost tax revenues that the OECD and 
G20 nations are working to retrieve may not be so significant.208 Despite these 
concerns, the BEPS plan is not entirely about increasing revenue, but also 
about ensuring fairness in the taxation system and regaining the trust of citi-
zens who believe they are being cheated by the system.209 
Additional tax revenue would be significant in developing countries that 
are more reliant on corporate income tax revenues.210 One unintended conse-
quence of the BEPS action plan, however, is the tax burden that it may place 
on workers.211 The combination of capital and labor allows for productivity.212 
An increase in capital leads to increased productivity, which will eventually 
lead to increased pay for workers.213 When that capital is taxed more heavily, 
less capital will be utilized and the wages of the workers will be diminished.214 
When the effects of the BEPS plan are considered in this light, the workers in 
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developing countries, who are among the poorest people in the world, will be 
faced with an increased tax burden.215 
Another significant issue in addressing the problem of BEPS is the insist-
ence on using the arm’s length principle by the United States and other coun-
tries.216 The suggestion that transactions between different branches within a 
multinational corporation are freely negotiated is often false.217 Under this sys-
tem, the multinational corporations will be able to negotiate with tax admin-
istrations regarding the allocation of their tax bases throughout their multiple 
tax jurisdictions.218 Even with the coming changes, the concepts utilized in 
allocating profits still often allow for multinational corporations to make allo-
cation decisions at their discretion.219 Because the arm’s length principal is not 
truly indicative of how these transactions actually occur, the effects of new 
regulations on transfer pricing may still result in under-taxation or they may 
assess transactions in ways that do not accurately reflect the nature of the 
transactions.220 
F. Issues with Creating New Regulations 
While the IRS has attempted to implement regulations through interpreta-
tions and provisions of the tax code, it has faced a number of challenges.221 In 
particular, the decision of the Tax Court in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner po-
tentially opens the door for taxpayers to question the validity of other provi-
sions of Section 482 that overreach.222 Taxpayers will feel more confident 
challenging any other current or future regulations that they believe fail to 
meet the proper promulgation standards.223 The IRS can no longer arbitrarily 
create regulations; instead, it must provide efficient data to justify the regula-
tions.224 
The ruling in Altera is not only significant in the context of transfer pric-
ing regulations, but also as it relates to the general validity of tax regula-
tions.225 In the future, the IRS will face more scrutiny in its creation of new 
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regulations, which will effectively limit its power.226 Any regulations previous-
ly created based on this approach may now be in serious jeopardy of being 
overturned because the decision casts doubt on the promulgation process for 
many current regulations still in effect.227 
The IRS will now be required to gather relevant facts and data to support 
the results created by new regulations.228 The IRS cannot make regulations 
based on the way it believes multinational corporations should act; rather, reg-
ulations must be backed by sufficient empirical evidence showing how unre-
lated parties actually behave in similar situations.229 Even though I.R.C Section 
482 does not explicitly require interpretation in accordance with the arm’s 
length principle, U.S. courts and the comments of the U.S. Treasury have con-
sistently stated that the principle is incorporated within the statute.230 Despite 
its limitation of the IRS’s ability to regulate BEPS, the Altera decision is ulti-
mately favorable for taxpayers because it forces the IRS to provide empirical 
data to justify its regulations.231 
G. Use of the Multilateral Instrument 
In late 2016, the OECD finalized a multilateral instrument to assist in the 
implementation of tax treaty measures in participating jurisdictions.232 While 
ceremonial signing of the instrument is not expected until June 2017, the fina-
lization of the instrument itself is a key step in the right direction.233 This in-
strument is essential as it will allow any country that signs on to update all of 
its treaties simultaneously, rather than having to re-negotiate each one individ-
ually.234 Because the multilateral instrument must be flexible enough to amend 
over three thousand treaties with various differences, some believe the instru-
ment is obtuse.235 While the multilateral instrument has the power to amend all 
of these treaties, effects may be slowed by the fact that countries may select 
which of their treaties will be covered and those treaties will only be amended 
if all other parties to the treaties also select them to be covered.236 
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H. Safe Harbors 
The creation of safe harbor provisions produces a number of benefits.237 
Safe harbors are able to be either exclude transactions from the scope of trans-
fer pricing rules if they surpass a certain threshold or apply simplified rules 
where the transaction price or profit falls within a certain range.238 Safe har-
bors make it easier for taxpayers to comply and reduce the compliance cost for 
eligible taxpayers.239 In many instances, it would be too expensive to apply the 
arm’s length principle considering the amount of revenue that would be 
brought in by the taxpayer.240 The excessive cost of the arm’s length principle 
makes the use of a safe harbor provision the best option.241 
The use of a safe harbor provision also provides taxpayers with a degree 
of certainty that their prices and transactions will be accepted by the tax ad-
ministrations.242 This allows taxpayers to have their prices approved with a 
limited audit, or even without an audit, if they are simply able to show they fall 
within the safe harbor provision.243 
In addition to making it easier for the taxpayers to comply and reducing 
compliance costs, safe harbors simplify the administrative process for tax ad-
ministrations.244 Safe harbors limit the amount of resources that tax administra-
tors have to devote to transfer pricing issues, and allow them to redirect those 
resources elsewhere.245 Tax administrations still need to ensure the taxpayers 
actually fall within the safe harbor, but beyond that, minimal further examina-
tion is required.246 This administrative efficiency is particularly useful in low 
risk situations, as the tax administrators are not forced to dedicate a dispropor-
tionate amount of resources to the issue.247 The newly saved resources can then 
be dedicated to matters where they may be put to better use.248 These safe har-
bors may also increase compliance among taxpayers and smaller taxpaying 
entities that otherwise may have escaped examination.249 
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Despite these numerous benefits, the implementation of safe harbor pro-
visions is not without its faults.250 For instance, safe harbors create a system 
that accepts looser compliance with the arm’s length principle in exchange for 
more efficiency.251 Safe harbors also create questions regarding the equity and 
uniformity of the tax system.252 Furthermore, if safe harbors are only adopted 
unilaterally, there will be a greater risk of either double taxation or double non-
taxation for the multinational corporation.253 
The potential disadvantages of straying away from the arm’s length prin-
ciple may be avoided by allowing taxpayers to choose between utilizing the 
safe harbor provision and electing to price transactions in accordance with the 
arm’s length principle.254 This option would allow taxpayers who believe they 
are reporting more income under the safe harbor provisions than they other-
wise would have under the arm’s length principle to use the general transfer 
pricing rules.255 While this system may make more sense for the taxpayers, it 
creates a new issue for the tax administration.256 The tax administrators would 
be faced with the issue of determining whether this system is too favorable to 
the taxpayer, as it would require the taxpayer to pay tax only on the lesser of 
the safe harbor amount and the amount consistent with the arm’s length princi-
ple.257 Countries must consider the benefits of the safe harbor against the po-
tential loss of tax revenue.258 
The implementation of a safe harbor further increases the risk of double 
taxation and non-taxation.259 If safe harbor provisions are set at prices above or 
below the prices in accordance with the arm’s length principle, taxpayers will 
be inclined to modify prices in order to avoid transfer pricing scrutiny in the 
safe harbor country.260 Multinational corporations would be particularly in-
clined to do this in countries that impose significant penalties for understate-
ment of tax or failure to fulfill documentation requirements.261 By making sure 
they fall within the safe harbor provisions in these nations, multinational cor-
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porations will be able to have their transfer pricing accepted in the country 
without further review.262 The safe harbor provisions could potentially result in 
tax avoidance as multinational corporations manipulate their income and fi-
nancial statements to fall within the confines of the safe harbor.263 
Safe harbors that allow taxpayers to report income above the amount 
deemed appropriate through the arm’s length principle would be beneficial to 
the tax administration of the safe harbor country.264 However, the tax admin-
istration of a country on the other side of the transaction may challenge the 
prices from the application of a safe harbor, which could potentially result in 
double taxation.265 
Any benefits gained by the tax administration of the safe harbor country 
might only come at the expense of the tax administration of the country on the 
other side of the transaction.266 The country on the other side of the transaction 
would have to then examine the transaction and determine whether the applica-
tion of the safe harbor provision in the safe harbor country is consistent with 
its own tax rules.267 In many instances, when an issue arises as a result of the 
safe harbor provision, it is beyond the authority of a foreign tax administration 
to require the levels to be reported in accordance with the arm’s length princi-
ple.268 The unilateral adoption of safe harbor provisions would likely lead to 
contradicting tax regulations between countries and incline the multinational 
corporations to report income in such a manner that would benefit one country 
while hurting another.269 
In order to safeguard against such disadvantages, safe harbors should be 
adopted on a bilateral or multilateral basis.270 This will prevent the benefits of 
one country from negatively impacting another.271 To help ensure success in 
instances where countries are willing to enter into bilateral or multilateral safe 
harbor agreements, these countries should target a small range of acceptable re-
sults and require consistent financial reporting in all countries that are party to 
the agreement.272 Further, countries may use treaties for the exchange of infor-
mation to ensure proper reporting under bilateral safe harbor provisions.273 
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I. Going Forward 
The OECD plan to address BEPS will likely have a significant effect on 
tax evasion issues created by multinational corporations going forward, but it 
will not wholly solve the problem.274 More efforts are needed to further pre-
vent the effects of BEPS.275 While the OECD and the G20 nations represent a 
large number of states, an adequate solution cannot be created using solely 
their perspectives.276 In its current form, the BEPS plan will only be partially 
effective and will pose major problems of implementation.277 Beyond reform, 
more parties must be involved so the solutions can be monitored, implemented 
and the relevant parties can be provided with the assistance they need to better 
understand their responsibilities.278 It is clear that the BEPS plan is the first 
step in a process of resolving the multitude of issues surrounding the taxation 
of multinational corporations.279 
CONCLUSION 
The efforts put forth thus far are positive moves toward ensuring multina-
tional corporations pay their fair share in taxes, however, transfer pricing must 
be regulated more closely in order to eliminate BEPS by multinational corpo-
rations. Although the efforts to prevent BEPS primarily target the multinational 
corporations that would provide the most revenue, the same rules must apply 
to all. While the intentions of the OECD are noble, the current plan will likely 
prove more beneficial to developed countries. Creating an effective plan to 
combat BEPS should not involve this type of tradeoff. While the OECD should 
not disproportionately burden the economies of developing nations to assist 
developed nations, it must strike a balance between efficiency and strict appli-
cation of regulations. In instances where the additional revenue would be in-
significant compared to the additional efforts required, tax administrations may 
find it best to create exceptions such as safe harbors. 
Although not all of the loopholes will be closed, narrowing the gaps is es-
sential to creating a more fair tax system. The BEPS plan is a positive step to-
ward a better international tax system. If the plan is executed properly, it will 
be beneficial to developed and undeveloped countries alike. The BEPS plan 
will level the playing field for corporations, forcing them to pay their proper 
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share of taxes, while also ensuring that governments receive the taxes they are 
owed. 
